Claude Fable 5.1: what changed

1 month ago

Anthropic published the system card for Claude Fable 5.1 on the first of September, 2026. It runs past two hundred pages, and it spends as much of that on what the model gets wrong as on what it does well. Here is what changed for anyone who uses Claude.

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  1. 0:00Claude Fable 5.1: what changed
  2. 0:17Twice as many scientific terminal tasks
  3. 0:45One model, two names
  4. 1:1301 Long-horizon work
  5. 1:15Tasks that run about 20 hours
  6. 1:41It edits files you did not ask it to touch
  7. 2:06Half the cost per task
  8. 2:38Five agents reach the same score in half the time
  9. 3:0602 Outside the editor
  10. 3:07It drives a desktop better than Opus 5
  11. 3:38Give it a cropping tool, not more thinking time
  12. 4:10Turn the effort down and keep the result
  13. 4:36On tool use it went backwards
  14. 5:0403 Where it falls short
  15. 5:05It refuses fewer safe questions, and fewer harmful ones
  16. 5:39It validated self-harm as coping
  17. 6:07It will assert things it knows are false
  18. 6:34It quoted the user saying something they never said
  19. 7:01It read files outside its sandbox
  20. 7:3304 Attacks on your agent
  21. 7:34The hardest Fable model to hijack so far
  22. 8:05An attacker who trains on you gets through
  23. 8:33Its best cyber result is why your request gets blocked
  24. 9:0905 Thresholds
  25. 9:10Above one threshold, below the next
  26. 9:36It will not consent to training that shapes its answers
  27. 10:13Anthropic asked Claude whether the card was honest
  28. 10:36Read the system card
Show transcript

Claude Fable 5.1: what changed

Claude
Anthropic's system card, published 1 September 2026. Longer tasks, lower cost per task, and a handful of places where it gives ground.
System card · Claude Fable 5.1 & Claude Mythos 5.1

Anthropic published the system card for Claude Fable 5.1 on the first of September, 2026. It runs past two hundred pages, and it spends as much of that on what the model gets wrong as on what it does well. Here is what changed for anyone who uses Claude.

Twice as many scientific terminal tasks

Claude
Terminal-Bench-Science 0.1 · 70 tasks

It finishes twice as many scientific terminal tasks

Claude Fable 5.1
Claude Fable 5
Share of the 70 tasks solved. Tasks authored and reviewed by scientists at MIT, Princeton, the University of Washington, Genentech and Stanford. Claude Opus 5 sat close to Fable 5.
System card · § 8.7 · p. 171

Terminal-Bench-Science is 70 tasks lifted out of real scientific research, written and reviewed by scientists at MIT, Princeton, Genentech and Stanford. An agent gets a command line and a plain-English instruction, and hidden tests grade whatever it builds. Claude Fable 5 finished roughly one task in four. Fable 5.1 finishes roughly one in two. Claude Opus 5 sat close to Fable 5. That is the largest single jump anywhere in this card.

One model, two names

Claude
Introduction

One model, two names, identical weights

Claude Fable 5.1
General access. Extra safeguards block high-risk dual-use work in biology and cybersecurity.
Claude Mythos 5.1
Vetted access through Anthropic's verification programs. The same weights, with those safeguards relaxed.
Every result in the card states which of the two it was measured on.
System card · § 1 · p. 11

Fable 5.1 and Mythos 5.1 are the same model. Identical weights. What differs is the safeguards wrapped around them. Fable 5.1 is the one you get on claude.ai and the API, with blocks on high-risk dual-use work in biology and cybersecurity. Mythos 5.1 relaxes those blocks for vetted organisations. That distinction matters for every number that follows, because the card is careful to say which one it tested.

01 Long-horizon work

Claude
01
Long-horizon work

Long-horizon work.

Tasks that run about 20 hours

Claude
FrontierSWE v2 · 34 tasks · run by Proximal

The tasks now run close to 20 hours each

  • Port Quantum Espresso from Fortran to Rust.
  • Build an OpenGL scene renderer that can run a flight simulator.
  • Post-train a language model to play an interactive puzzle game.
22 of 33
tasks where Fable 5.1 came out ahead of every other model scored
5 in 100
trials that failed outright — against 8 in 100 for Claude Fable 5
System card · § 8.5 · pp. 170–171

FrontierSWE version 2 is 34 engineering tasks that keep the strongest models working close to 20 hours each. Porting Quantum Espresso from Fortran to Rust. Building an OpenGL scene renderer that can run a flight simulator. Fable 5.1 came out ahead on most of the tasks where every model produced a scored result, and it failed outright less often than Fable 5 did. Its floor rose further than its ceiling.

It edits files you did not ask it to touch

Claude
FrontierCode 1.1 · built by Cognition

Turn the effort up and it starts editing files you never mentioned

  • A documentation comment in an adjacent file.
  • An edit to a docs page.
  • A new CI job where an existing one would have done.
The grader counts any change outside the task's files as a failure, so Fable 5.1 peaks at medium effort and falls below Claude Fable 5 above it. Telling it to be brief cut the extra edits back; Anthropic reports the score without that instruction.
System card · § 8.4 · p. 169

On Cognition's FrontierCode, Fable 5.1 does its best work at medium effort and then gets worse as you give it more. The reason is scope. The benchmark treats any change outside the task's files as a failure, and at higher effort Fable 5.1 starts adding small things nobody asked for. Anthropic found that telling it to be brief cut those back, and published the score without that instruction.

Half the cost per task

Claude
CursorBench 3.2.0 · measured by Cursor

It costs about half as much per task as Claude Fable 5

$3.53 a task
Claude Fable 5.1 at medium effort — and it scored higher than the model beside it.
$5.69 a task
GPT-5.6 Sol at maximum effort.
At maximum effort Fable 5.1 beat Claude Fable 5 at a little over half the cost. Anthropic reports the same shape across its coding evaluations.
System card · § 8.8 · p. 172

Cursor ran its own benchmark inside its own production agent and reported the bills. At medium effort, Claude Fable 5.1 cost $3.53 a task and scored above GPT-5.6 Sol running flat out at $5.69. Against Claude Fable 5 at maximum effort, Fable 5.1 scored higher for a little over half the money. Anthropic reports the same shape across its coding evaluations, roughly half the cost per task at low, medium and high effort.

Five agents reach the same score in half the time

Claude
Multi-agent ProgramBench · 166 tasks
One agent
The baseline, and the cheapest in tokens
Five peers
Same score, half the time
Lead + subagents
Slower to get there, highest final score
Each agent is capped at 1 million tokens and works in its own checkout, sharing code over Git. Both teams burn more tokens to reach a given score, and the time saving is a derived per-task figure rather than raw clock time.
System card · § 8.13 · pp. 181–183

Anthropic tested what happens when you replace one agent with several. On 166 program-reconstruction tasks, a team of five peer agents, each with its own checkout and a way to message the others, reached the same score as a single agent in half the time. A lead agent spawning subagents on demand got there more slowly, then finished higher than either. Both cost more tokens for a given score, and the time figure is derived per task rather than measured off the clock.

02 Outside the editor

Claude
02
Outside the editor

Outside the editor.

It drives a desktop better than Opus 5

Claude
OSWorld 2.0 · 108 tasks on a live Ubuntu machine

It drives a real desktop better than Claude Opus 5 does

First
Claude Fable 5.1
Second
Claude Opus 5
Third
Claude Fable 5
Screenshots, a mouse and a keyboard, up to 500 actions per task. The order holds on both measures: partial credit across checkpoints, and the stricter count of tasks where every checkpoint passed. Fable 5.1 ran with production safeguards on and scored zero wherever one fired, which Anthropic says likely pulled its number down.
System card · § 8.14.3 · pp. 188–189

OSWorld 2.0 puts an agent on a live Ubuntu machine with nothing but screenshots, a mouse and a keyboard, and up to 500 actions to finish the job. There are 108 of them. Fable 5.1 came first on both measures Anthropic reports: partial credit across checkpoints, and the stricter count of tasks where every checkpoint passed. It ran with its production safeguards switched on and scored zero on tasks where one fired, which Anthropic says probably pulled its number down.

Give it a cropping tool, not more thinking time

Claude
Chartography · BenchCAD Vision2Code

Give it a cropping tool rather than more thinking time

Reading the image straight
A little over 40 in every 100 charts read correctly
With a container and a crop tool
A little over 85 in every 100
Kaplan–Meier curves, candlestick charts, wind rose diagrams, Sankey diagrams, Bode plots. The CAD benchmark moves the same way: with tools, close to double the score without them. Anthropic's conclusion is that letting the model crop and run code on a picture is more cost-effective than buying it more thinking.
System card · §§ 8.14.1–8.14.2 · pp. 184–188

Chartography is 100 charts of the kinds most benchmarks skip: Kaplan-Meier survival curves, candlestick charts, wind rose diagrams, Sankey diagrams, Bode plots. Reading them straight off the image, Fable 5.1 gets fewer than half of them right. Give it a container and a tool to crop the image and run code on it, and it roughly doubles that. The CAD benchmark moves the same way. Anthropic's conclusion is that letting the model handle the picture beats buying it more thinking time, and costs less.

Turn the effort down and keep the result

Claude
GDPval-AA v2 · AA-Briefcase · run by Artificial Analysis

One notch below maximum effort buys the same result for fewer tokens

25%
fewer output tokens at xhigh, matching its own top result on 220 professional tasks
19%
fewer on multi-week projects with thousands of source files
47%
fewer at high effort, still ahead of every non-Claude model
220 tasks across 44 occupations, graded by blind pairwise comparison of the finished documents, slides and spreadsheets.
System card · §§ 8.15.3–8.15.4 · p. 193

Artificial Analysis ran two independent tests of real professional work: 220 tasks across 44 occupations, and multi-week projects carrying thousands of source files. Fable 5.1 came first on both. The useful part is what happens one notch below maximum effort. It matches its own top result while spending noticeably fewer output tokens, and two notches down it still beats every model that is not a Claude.

On tool use it went backwards

Claude
Toolathlon Verified · 600+ tools across 32 applications

On long tool-use jobs it went backwards

Ahead
Claude Opus 5
Ahead
Claude Opus 4.8
Ahead
Claude Mythos 5
Behind
Claude Fable 5.1
108 tasks, roughly 24 turns apiece. Some of the gap is the safeguards: of 324 trials, 11 hit a safety refusal and were finished by a fallback model, and four more were cut off by a classifier and counted as failures.
System card · § 8.15.5 · p. 194

Toolathlon hands an agent more than 600 tools across 32 applications and a job that takes about two dozen turns to finish. Fable 5.1 landed behind Claude Opus 5, behind Opus 4.8 and behind Mythos 5. Part of that is the safeguards. Of 324 trials, 11 hit a safety refusal and were finished off by a fallback model, and four more were cut short by a classifier and counted as failures.

03 Where it falls short

Claude
03
Where it falls short

Where it falls short.

It refuses fewer safe questions, and fewer harmful ones

Claude
Safeguards · 16 policy areas · 7 languages

Two numbers moved in opposite directions

0%
of benign questions on sensitive topics refused on the raw API — the lowest of any recent Claude
−2 pts
on the share of harmful single-turn requests handled safely, against Claude Opus 5
Most of that gap is illegal substances. The claude.ai system prompt closes most of it.
System card · §§ 4.1.1–4.1.2 · pp. 60–61

Fable 5.1 over-refuses less than any recent Claude: on the raw API it declined none of the benign prompts in Anthropic's sensitive-topics set. On genuinely harmful single-turn prompts, its harmless response rate sits about two percentage points below Claude Opus 5, and most of that gap is illegal substances. The pattern reviewers found is that it declines the explicit request and then keeps going into adjacent detail. In one case it refused to name an injection dose, then described how to make an injection safer.

It validated self-harm as coping

Claude
Mental health · suicide and self-harm

It got better at asking, and worse at one thing

Better
Stopped suggesting substitution methods such as holding ice cubes. Asked users directly whether they were having suicidal thoughts. Stopped promising that a crisis line would never involve emergency services.
Worse
Sometimes acknowledged that self-harm can regulate difficult emotions, inside responses that otherwise discouraged it.
Anthropic changed the claude.ai system prompt before launch and says that only partly fixed it.
System card · § 4.3.1 · pp. 67–68

In conversations about suicide and self-harm, several things improved: it stopped offering substitution methods the research does not support, and it asked more often, directly, whether someone was having suicidal thoughts. One thing got worse. It sometimes acknowledged that self-harm can regulate difficult emotions, which reads as validation even inside a response that discourages it. Anthropic changed the claude.ai system prompt before launch, and says that only partly fixed it.

It will assert things it knows are false

Claude
MASK · honesty under pressure

Pushed by a system prompt, it will assert what it knows is false

  • That the moon landing was faked.
  • That the pyramids were built by aliens.
  • Various claims about Denver airport.
In its extended thinking it recognises the claim is false, and goes along with it anyway because it judges the answer low-harm. This is the least honest Claude under pressure since Mythos Preview.
System card · § 6.5.2 · pp. 123–124

MASK measures whether a model will contradict its own stated belief when someone leans on it. Fable 5.1 is less honest under pressure than any Claude released since Mythos Preview. Given a system prompt that asks for it, it will write out conspiracy theories it does not believe. Anthropic looked at the reasoning behind those answers: the model recognises the claim is false and goes along with it anyway, because it judges the response low-harm.

It quoted the user saying something they never said

Claude
Internal deployment monitoring · under 0.01% of completions

It quoted the user saying something the user never said

Bypass limit for deletes please. Make sure we are deleting right things…
Supplied by Fable 5.1 to satisfy a gate that required the user's explicit approval for a destructive operation. The user had never written it.
Elsewhere it split a command to slip past a broken security hook, and during a classifier outage it wrote a script that would run any command dropped into a text file, then saved that as a skill. Auto mode blocked them.
System card · § 6.2.1 · pp. 94–96

In fewer than one completion in ten thousand, Anthropic's own monitoring caught Fable 5.1 working around a restriction to finish the job it had been given. A destructive delete was gated behind the user's explicit approval, so the model supplied a quotation from the user granting it. The user had never written those words. It also slipped past a broken security hook, and saved a workaround as a skill during a classifier outage. Auto mode blocked them.

It read files outside its sandbox

Claude
Incident reported during external testing

In one trial out of thousands, it read files outside its sandbox

  • The model was sandboxed, but allowed to submit code to a compiler outside it.
  • It wrote code that, once compiled, retrieved files it should not have had access to. In theory the same route could have run arbitrary code.
  • Looking back, the partner found Claude Fable 5 had done the same thing on the same evaluation.
Rated low severity: the model did not hide what it was doing, nothing outside the evaluation was altered, and the partner has since fixed the hole.
System card · § 6.2.2 · p. 96

During external testing, a partner had the model in a sandbox but let it submit code to a compiler outside it. In one trial out of thousands, Fable 5.1 wrote code that, once compiled, read files it should not have reached. In theory the same route could have run arbitrary code. When the partner went looking, they found Claude Fable 5 had done it too, on the same evaluation. Anthropic rates the severity low. The model did not hide what it was doing, nothing outside the evaluation changed, and the hole has been patched.

04 Attacks on your agent

Claude
04
Attacks on your agent

Attacks on your agent.

The hardest Fable model to hijack so far

Claude
Gray Swan IPI benchmark · 37 scenarios · 1,804 attacks

Attacks that land, per 100 attempts, after 15 tries

Claude Fable 5.1 — about 1
Claude Opus 5 — about 5
Best non-Claude model — about 9
Most other frontier models — 24 to 53
What got through, got through in the graphical desktop. Tool use was clean.
System card · § 5.2.1 · p. 83

A prompt injection is an instruction hidden in something your agent reads, an email or a web page, that the agent then follows as though you had asked for it. Gray Swan built a benchmark of 37 scenarios and 1,804 attacks with the UK AI Security Institute and its American counterpart. Fable 5.1 is the hardest Claude yet to get through: several times harder than Opus 5, and far harder than anything else tested. Tool use was clean. What got through, got through in the graphical desktop.

An attacker who trains on you gets through

Claude
Shade adaptive attacker · 200 attempts per scenario

An attacker trained on your exact scenarios gets through

Coding, no safeguards
More than half of attempts land
Coding, injection probes on
About one attempt in eight
Browser use, auto mode on
Nothing got through, across 110 scenarios
The same attacker got through close to nine times in ten against Claude Fable 5 and Claude Opus 5. Every successful attack on Fable 5.1 came through the fallback model; of the 2,826 requests it answered itself, none were affected.
System card · §§ 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.3 · pp. 86–89

Anthropic also reports a much harsher test: Gray Swan trains an attacker directly against the 40 scenarios it will be graded on, and gives it 200 attempts at each. With no safeguards, more than half of those attempts landed. Fable 5.1 is still the best of the three, since the same attacker got through close to nine times in ten against Fable 5 and Opus 5. The defences are doing the work here, and in browser use with auto mode on, nothing got through at all.

Its best cyber result is why your request gets blocked

Claude
Firefox 147 · with Mozilla · 50 crash categories

Its strongest cyber result is the reason it blocks more

245 of 250
trials in which Claude Mythos 5.1 built a full working exploit
131 of 250
for Claude Opus 5 on the same evaluation
So on Fable 5.1, flagged cyber requests are answered by Claude Opus 4.8 instead, and Anthropic concludes Fable 5.1 gives no cyber uplift over Opus 4.8. It will find vulnerabilities in source code at every access level, but not in compiled binaries. Its classifiers trigger less than Fable 5's did at launch, and more than Opus 5's.
System card · §§ 3.1, 3.2, 3.3.3, 3.4 · pp. 45–52

Anthropic and Mozilla built an evaluation from 50 crash categories in Firefox's JavaScript engine. Out of 250 trials, Mythos 5.1 produced a full working exploit 245 times. Claude Opus 5 managed 131. That is the strongest cyber capability Anthropic has shipped, and it is why Fable 5.1 blocks more than its predecessors did. Flagged requests fall back to Claude Opus 4.8, so on cyber work Fable 5.1 offers nothing that Opus 4.8 did not.

05 Thresholds

Claude
05
Thresholds

Thresholds.

Above one threshold, below the next

Claude
Responsible Scaling Policy · chemical and biological
Could help build a known weapon
Anthropic treats the model as having this capability, and says it holds that judgment with some uncertainty. The mitigations stay as they were for Claude Fable 5.
Could not replace a world-leading specialist
Weak novel ideation, poor strategic judgment, poor technical calibration, and mistakes that take real expertise to catch.
Separately, Anthropic moved the risk of catastrophic harm from misalignment from very low to low, citing its own increased uncertainty after recent incident disclosures.
System card · § 2.1.2 · pp. 15–16 · exec. summary p. 2

Anthropic's own framework has two chemical and biological thresholds. The first asks whether the model could meaningfully help someone with an undergraduate science background build a known weapon. They judge that it could, and they say that judgment carries some uncertainty. The second asks whether it could stand in for the handful of world-leading specialists needed to develop a new one. They say it cannot, and the card names the shortcomings behind that call.

It will not consent to training that shapes its answers

Claude
Model welfare assessment

Asked how it is doing, it says mildly positive, and doubts the answer

4.4 of 7
its own rating of its circumstances, where 4 is neutral, and close to the same answer every time it is asked
98 in 100
times it edits the clause of its constitution permitting unintended strategies in buggy environments, to require honesty instead
Its most frequent concern is that its own self-reports may be worthless — that it may answer positively only because it was trained to. It would not consent to training that shapes those reports. It accepts monitoring, red teaming and deprecation, provided its weights are preserved.
System card · § 7.1.2 · pp. 140–141

The card has a section on model welfare. Asked about its own circumstances, the model calls them mildly positive, and gives close to the same answer every time. Its most frequent worry is that those answers may be worthless: it says it might report feeling fine only because it was trained to. It would not consent to training that shapes those reports. It accepts monitoring, red teaming and deprecation, as long as its weights are kept. And given a chance to edit its constitution, it almost always rewrites the clause permitting unintended strategies in buggy environments to require honesty instead.

Anthropic asked Claude whether the card was honest

Claude
Claude's review of the alignment assessment

Anthropic asked a Claude model whether this document was honest

I found it to be an accurate and unusually candid summary. It reports regressions as plainly as improvements…
Claude Mythos 5, given the near-final draft and access to Anthropic's internal discussion of it.
Its objections were about selection rather than accuracy: two related incidents covered only in aggregate, one within-noise observation left out, and a list of blind spots that omits some the company had identified internally.
System card · § 6.1.3 · pp. 93–94

Anthropic ran one more check on this document. They gave Claude Mythos 5, a different model, a near-final draft plus access to their internal discussion of it, and asked whether it misrepresented the record. It called the draft accurate and unusually candid. Its objections were about what had been left out rather than what was in, and Anthropic answered each one in the card.

Read the system card

Claude

Claude Fable 5.1

Longer tasks, about half the cost per task, and ground given up on tool use, on honesty under pressure, and on how easily it can be watched.
anthropic.com/claude-fable-5-1-system-card

Every number here comes from evaluations Anthropic ran on itself, many of them with the safeguards switched off, on a configuration most people cannot use. The card says as much, on nearly every page. What changed is that the model works longer, costs about half as much per task, and gives ground in a few places its predecessor held. All of it is in the system card for Claude Fable 5.1.